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Abstract—Ransomware attacks are a prevalent cybersecurity
threat to every user and enterprise today. This is attributed
to their polymorphic behaviour and dispersion of inexhaustible
versions due to the same ransomware family or threat actor. A
certain ransomware family or threat actor repeatedly utilises
nearly same style or codebase to create a vast number of
ransomware versions. Therefore, it is essential for users and
enterprises to keep well-informed about this threat landscape
and adopt proactive prevention strategies to minimise its spread
and affects. This requires a technique to detect ransomware
samples to determine the similarity and link with the known
ransomware family or threat actor. Therefore, this paper presents
a detection method for ransomware by employing a combination
of a similarity preserving hashing method called fuzzy hashing
and a clustering method. This detection method is applied
on the collected WannaCry/WannaCryptor ransomware samples
utilising a range of fuzzy hashing and clustering methods. The
clustering results of various clustering methods are evaluated
through the use of the internal evaluation indexes to determine
the accuracy and consistency of their clustering results, thus the
effective combination of fuzzy hashing and clustering method
as applied to the particular ransomware corpus. The proposed
detection method is a static analysis method, which requires
fewer computational overheads and performs rapid comparative
analysis with respect to other static analysis methods.
Index Terms—Ransomware; Similarity Preserving Hashing;
Fuzzy Hashing; SSDEEP; SDHASH; Clustering, K-Means; PAM;
AGNES; DIANA, CLARA; WannaCry; WannaCryptor.
I. INTRODUCTION
A ransomware attack is as an attempt to extort a user or
enterprise by denying it access to its data by encrypting or
locking it. Generally, ransomware encrypts data, however, it
may apply different approach such as locking or erasing data.
The concept of ransom related IT crime is an old one and was
first discussed by Donn Parker, in the publication Crime by
Computer [1] in 1976. However, ransomware infections have
increased significantly in recent years, developing into one of
the most significant and problematic cybercrime known, due
to its polymorphism. WannaCry or WannaCryptor is such an
example, having emerged in the last five years, causing a total
loss of around $4 billion to both organisations and individuals
[2], [3]. The extent of the loss by ransomware as demonstrated
by research conducted by Cybersecurity Ventures which pre-
dicted the global damage due to ransomware would reach as
high as $11.5 billion annually by 2019 [4]. The crux of this
analysis is that “ransomware will have attacked a business
every 14 seconds by the end of 2019” [4].
Detecting new or unknown ransomware requires a method
that can process the ransomware corpus using unlabelled or
generic labels (mostly mislabelled), satisfactorily [5]. Such
detection methods are capable of finding matched samples and
determining their degree of similarity, thus assisting further
classification of samples into the most appropriate groups. In
the first stage, fuzzy hashing can be used to find matched
sample(s) with a degree of similarity [6]. Nonetheless, the clas-
sification of samples can be accomplished by either clustering
or classification, but any classification technique necessitates
accurate labelling of samples that is a tedious task because
there is no universally accepted taxonomy [7]. Consequently,
in the second stage, it is useful to cluster similar samples
within the corpus [8]. Therefore, this paper presents a detection
method for ransomware by employing a combination of a
similarity preserving hashing method called fuzzy hashing
and a clustering method. This detection method is applied on
the collected WannaCry/WannaCryptor ransomware samples
utilising fuzzy hashing methods SSDEEP [9], SDHASH [10]
and clustering methods K-Mean [11], PAM [12], AGNES
[13], DIANA [13], CLARA [12]. The clustering results of
these clustering methods are evaluated through the use of
three internal evaluation indexes, the Dunn Index [14], the
Silhouette Index [15] and Connectivity Index [16], which
are used to determine the accuracy and consistency of their
clustering results, thus, the effective combination of fuzzy
hashing and clustering method can be selected for the particu-
lar ransomware corpus. Later, the detection results can be used
for both advanced static and dynamic analysis of ransomware.
The paper is organised into the subsequent sections: Sec-
tion II describes fuzzy hashing and its types SSDEEP and
SDHASH methods; clustering and its types Partitioning-Based
Clustering and Hierarchical Clustering. Section III explains the
process of gathering WannaCry or WannaCryptor ransomware
samples for the implementation of this proposed ransomware
detection method. Section IV outlines the proposed detection
method for ransomware using fuzzy hashing and clustering.
Section V presents the experimental evaluation of the combi-
nation of different fuzzy hashing methods and clustering meth-
ods and their detection results. Finally, Section VI presents the
summary of the paper and suggests some future enhancements.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. Fuzzy Hashing
In security analysis, hashing is used to determine both the
integrity and similarity of files under examination, the latter
utilising cryptographic techniques and the former utilising
fuzzy techniques. In malware investigation, when attempting
to determine malware strains it is the similarity of sample
which is of interest as often malware developers utilise similar
code, leading to different variants [9]. In this type of analysis,
generally, a file is divided into multiple blocks and a hash
value is calculated for each block, the final step being the
concatenation of all hash values of the blocks to generate
the fuzzy hash value as shown in Fig. 1. Several factors
are involved in determining the length of fuzzy hash value
including the block size, the file size, and the output size of
the selected hash function [17]. In contrast the complete file is
hashed in cryptographic hashing with the output hash having
a fixed size irrespective of input file size. There are different
categories of fuzzy hashing techniques, classified as follows:
Context-Triggered Piecewise Hashing (CTPH), Statistically-
Improbable Features (SIF), Block-Based Hashing (BBH) and
Block-Based Rebuilding (BBR) [18], [19], [20]. The compari-
son of files in forensic analysis, where known malware files are
compared with unknown samples for the purpose of triaging
and clustering of malware to identify new variants, requires
an understanding of the degree of similarity between samples.
This suggests the use of the similarity preserving characteristic
of fuzzy hashing which is effective in forensic investigation
when comparing new samples with existing malware families
for their triage and clustering, in samples which have the same
functionality, yet the same cryptographic values [21].
Generally, the similarity of samples can be measured based
upon their syntactic or semantic levels [21]. At a syntactic
level, two files are compared to find similarity on the basis of
their byte sequence of data but not the context of data. Whereas
at semantic level, two files are compared to find similarity on
the basis of their context [21]. Fuzzy hashing is only utilised
to find similarity between two files at syntactic level.
1) SSDEEP: The SSDEEP fuzzy hashing method was
initially developed for finding spam emails [9]. This method
divides a file into number of blocks based on the content of
that file. The endpoint points of these blocks are determined
Fig. 1. Generation of Fuzzy Hash Value in Fuzzy Hashing Method
by a rolling hash method utilising the Adler32 function [17].
Generating the SSDEEP fuzzy hash value for the file, consists
of calculating an individual hash value for each of block
and concatenating these into a single hash value. Similarity
between the two files is calculated by utilising Damerau-
Levenshtein distance function.
2) SDHASH: The SDHSH fuzzy hashing method finds
common and rare features in a file and matches the rare
features in another file to determine the degree of similarity
between the two files [10]. Generally a feature is a 64-byte
string and is found using an entropy calculation. It employs
the cryptographic hash function SHA-1 and Bloom filters to
calculate the SDHASH fuzzy hash value of a file [22]. A
Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure to
find whether the element is definitely not present in the set or
may be present in the set. Similarity between the two files is
calculated by utilising a Hamming distance function.
B. Clustering
Clustering is a machine learning algorithm used to group
data based upon their similarity or difference. It is utilised
when no prior knowledge of the dataset is known, partitioning
the data set and placing different objects into these groups
based upon their similarity or difference.
1) Partitioning-Based Clustering: Partitioning based clus-
tering is used to identify the number of partitions/groups in the
dataset based on their similarity or difference. It is an iterative
process beginning with random partitioning, relocating data
items from one cluster to another in each subsequent iteration.
Predominately, partitioning clustering methods require a pre-
determined value for the number of clusters to find. The most
commonly used partitioning clustering methods are k-means,
k-mediods/pam and clara [11], [12].
2) Hierarchical Clustering: Hierarchical clustering is a
substitution method of clustering used to identify similar
groups in the dataset. Unlike partitioning clustering, it does not
require a pre-determined cluster number to group the dataset.
Commonly, hierarchical clustering results are illustrated in
the form of tree structure called a dendrogram. It utilises a
pairwise distance/proximity matrix between observations as
clustering criteria. Hierarchical clustering is further classified
into two main categories: agglomerative clustering and divisive
clustering. The most commonly used hierarchical clustering
methods are agnes (agglomerative hierarchical) and diana
(divisive hierarchical).
III. COLLECTING WANNACRY/WANNACRYPTOR
RANSOMWARE SAMPLES
A Ransomware attack is a nefarious attack to extort money
from victims which is a more sophisticated tactic than the
DDoS attack to extort money [23], [24], [25]. It causes loss of
money and reputational damage to the business and sometimes
potentially permanent loss of data. Ransomware attack could
be a minor or severe depending on the category of ransomware,
nonetheless, certain types of ransomware are nefarious in
terms of their intention. Such ransomware are the priority for
this investigation such as WannaCry or WannaCryptor ran-
somware is one of the most significant variants of ransomware
in recently and is selected for this study [3], [26], [27], [28].
The most labour intensive task was the collection of credible
samples of the WannaCry ransomware. As a result of this
process, it was decided to collect a reasonable number of
WannaCry or WannaCryptor ransomware samples which could
be easily investigated manually. All the WannaCry samples
were gathered from two sources Hybrid Analysis [29] and
Malshare [30] and their analysis were performed through the
information acquired by VirusTotal [31]. The main difficulty
was to verify the credibility of the collected ransomware sam-
ples that they were very likely to be WannaCry ransomware
samples. The credibility of samples was evaluated through
the criteria set on the basis of the result of various detection
engines on VirusTotal, which was greater than or equal to 40,
means minimum 40 detection engines on VirusTotal diagnosed
the particular sample as ransomware/malware. To verify that
they were WannaCry or WannaCryptor ransomware, they
were manually checked on every detection engine, where a
number of the engines identified a sample as a WannaCry
or WannaCryptor ransomware. Nevertheless, this ransomware
verification process was complex, and mainly dependent on
the discretion of authors [32], [33], [34], [35], [36]. The
selection process was lengthy and demanding, consequently,
112 samples of WannaCry or WannaCryptor ransomware were
selected after each sample was fully analysed manually.
IV. PROPOSED DETECTION METHOD FOR RANSOMWARE
The proposed detection method for ransomware is a two-
stage process where, at the first stage, a fuzzy hashing method
identifies the similarity amongst the samples and generates
similarity scores, at the second stage a suitable clustering
method is employed to organise similar samples into one
group. However, this detection method may or may not require
an additional stage of unpacking the ransomware samples
using an unpacking tool; it is dependent on collected ran-
somware samples. If samples are not unpacked then it is the
initial requisite for ransomware analysis. Fuzzy hashing is used
for initial triaging, where it matches collected samples and
determines the percentage similarity of samples with known
samples if they are matched with any known sample. When
Fig. 2. A Detection Method for Ransomware
samples are matched, the similarity score can be further used
in clustering operation to find their groups or families [37].
Later, based on these similarity scores, the closeness of the
samples is computed to arrange them into similar groups by
utilising the preferred clustering method [38]. Fuzzy hashing is
one of the most efficient methods and requires fewer overheads
for processing a significant number of ransomware samples.
Essentially, Fuzzy hashing is beneficial due to its smaller hash
size, resulting lower memory and computational resources
as compared to alternative analysis techniques. Clustering
is the natural choice when very little or no information is
available about the new ransomware samples. The effective
combination of a fuzzy hashing and a clustering method can be
a respectable option for the initial analysis over other existing
detection methods as it is tested in this paper. Subsequently,
the detection results of this method can also be used for both
advanced static and dynamic analysis of ransomware.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF DIFFERENT
CLUSTERING METHODS AND THEIR DETECTION RESULTS
For the proposed detection method, five clustering methods
kmeans, pam, agnes, diana and clara are analysed to determine
the accuracy and consistency of their clustering results, thus,
the most efficient clustering method can be selected. Clustering
is an unsupervised technique as there are no standard labels
available, therefore, it is generally evaluated by using internal
indexes [38]. To avoid any bias in the results, three evaluation
indexes are utilised to build an accurate assessment of the
data and cluster quality for both fuzzy hashing and clustering
methods. The three internal evaluation indexes Dunn Index,
Silhouette Index and Connectivity Index are implemented in
clValid package of R [16], [39], [40], [41], [40]. The Dunn
Index has a value between Zero and∞, here the greater value
of the Dunn Index represents more accurate clustering results
[14]. The Silhouette Index has a value in the interval [−1, 1],
here the greater value of the Silhouette Index represents more
accurate clustering results [15]. The Connectivity Index has
a value between Zero and ∞, here the smaller value of the
Connectivity Index represents more accurate clustering results
[16]. For all the clustering methods, the values of all the
three indexes are computed for the range of clusters from
2 to 6 which is sufficient for a small dataset, checking the
quality and consistency of the clustering results based on all
these indexes. Finally the collective evaluation results of three
internal clustering indexes for each clustering is compared for
the optimal cluster size based on the ground truth.
A. Comparative Evaluation of Clustering Methods based on
SSDEEP Similarity Scores
This experiment has utilised the SSDEEP similarity scores
for clustering the collected WannaCry/WannaCryptor ran-
somware samples. The clustering results of all the clustering
methods are given in Tables I to III and Fig. 3, for the range
of clusters from 2 to 6 using three internal indexes Dunn,
Silhouette and Connectivity. The evaluation results show that
three clustering methods kmean, agnes and diana provide the
best results for all three internal indexes but for different
cluster size. In case of the Dunn index and Connectivity
indexes, the cluster size is two as shown in Tables I and III
respectively, whereas for the Silhouette index, the cluster size
is six as shown in Table II. Later, the collective evaluation
results of three internal clustering indexes for each clustering
is compared for the cluster size two (see Table IV), which is
the optimal cluster size based on the ground truth. This optimal
cluster size is determined based on the manual analysis of
WannaCry/WannaCryptor ransomware samples. The collective
evaluation results show that similar three clustering methods
kmeans, agnes (agglomerative hierarchical) and diana (divisive
hierarchical) performed well in comparison to others clustering
methods.
B. Comparative Evaluation of Clustering Methods based on
SDHASH Similarity Scores
This experiment has utilised SDHASH similarity scores for
clustering the collected WannaCry/WannaCryptor ransomware
samples. The clustering results of all the clustering methods
are given in Tables V to VII and Fig. 4, for the range of clusters
from 2 to 6 using three internal indexes Dunn, Silhouette
and Connectivity. The evaluation results show that there is
no single method providing the best results for all three
internal indexes. In case of the Dunn index and Silhouette
indexes, three clustering methods kmean, agnes and diana
have produced the best result for the cluster size three as
shown in Tables V and VI respectively. While for Connectivity
index, two clustering methods pam and clara have produced
the best result for the cluster size two as shown in VII.
Later, the collective evaluation results of three internal clus-
tering indexes for each clustering is compared for the cluster
size two (see Table VIII), which is the optimal cluster size
based on the ground truth. As mentioned earlier, this optimal
cluster size is determined based on the manual analysis of
WannaCry/WannaCryptor ransomware samples. The collective
evaluation results show that two clustering methods agnes
(agglomerative hierarchical) and diana (divisive hierarchical)
performed well in comparison to other clustering methods.
Both clustering methods agnes (agglomerative hierarchical)
and diana (divisive hierarchical) have one similarity that they
are a hierarchical clustering method, thus, it suggests that
hierarchical clustering is the most suitable method for both
fuzzy hashing methods SSDEEP and SDHASH. Nonetheless,
agglomerative clustering is good at identifying small clusters,
while divisive clustering is good at identifying large clusters.
Depending on the nature of data and number of clusters, a
preferred hierarchical clustering method can be selected.
C. Comparative Evaluation of SSDEEP and SDHASH Fuzzy
Hashing Methods
In this detection method, the first stage of fuzzy hashing
is crucial for generating improved clustering results and de-
tection rates. Therefore, the results of the two fuzzy hashing
methods SSDEEP and SDHASH are compared to evaluate
their effectiveness for the ransomware corpus. As stated pre-
viously, all the 112 WannaCry ransomware samples were
methodically confirmed as a ransomware sample, therefore,
this experiment does not consider the event of false positive
for both SSDEEP and SDHASH methods. Consequently, the
main aim of this experiment was to detect the similarity among
WannaCry/WannaCryptor ransomware samples and record the
degree of similarity amongst them. Both SSDEEP and SD-
HASH methods performed well and detected similarity for the
majority of the WannaCry/WannaCryptor ransomware sam-
ples. However, the detection results of the two fuzzy hashing
methods indicate two main differences between them. Firstly,
SDHASH detected similarity in more samples (108/112) than
SSDEEP (104/112). Secondly, SDHASH detection results
showed several insignificant values in the degree of similar-
ity between the samples whereas SSDEEP detection results
indicated largely significant values in the degree of similarity
between the samples. The similarity scores of a fuzzy hashing
method was the only key factor affecting the clustering results
for this detection method, which is reflected in the evaluation
of the clustering results based on these two methods. Both
fuzzy hashing methods are completely different with respect to
their working and both have their advantages and limitations
as SDHASH can detect similarity in large samples but that
may affect the clustering results due to weak similarity scores,
whereas SSDEEP may not detect as many similar samples as
SDHASH but can generate a different clustering results due
to the consideration of only strong similarity scores.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed an efficient detection method for ran-
somware by employing a combination of a fuzzy hashing and
a clustering method. This detection method applied on the col-
lected WannaCry/WannaCryptor ransomware samples utilising
fuzzy hashing methods SSDEEP, SDHASH and clustering
methods K-Mean, PAM, AGNES, DIANA, CLARA. The clus-
tering results of all these clustering methods were evaluated
through the use of three internal evaluation indexes Dunn
Index, Silhouette Index and Connectivity Index, to determine
the accuracy and consistency of their clustering results, thus,
the most effective combination of fuzzy hashing and clustering
method can be selected for the particular ransomware corpus.
Later, the detection results can be used for both advanced static
and dynamic analysis of ransomware. The clustering results
showed that two clustering methods AGNES and DIANA
performed well in comparison to other methods. Moreover,
both SSDEEP and SDHASH methods performed well and
Fig. 3. Dunn Index, Silhouette Index and Connectivity Index Graphs for Different Clustering Methods based on SSDEEP Similarity Scores for WannaCry
Ransomware
TABLE I
DUNN INDEX EVALUATION RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT CLUSTERING METHODS BASED ON THE SSDEEP FUZZY HASHING METHOD FOR WANNACRY
RANSOMWARE CORPUS
Clustering Method Cluster Size=2 Cluster Size=3 Cluster Size=4 Cluster Size=5 Cluster Size=6
kmeans 0.8348 0.7653 0.7074 0.7658 0.6628
pam 0.4661 0.0189 0.021 0.0219 0.0249
agnes 0.8348 0.7653 0.7185 0.7658 0.6628
diana 0.8348 0.7653 0.7185 0.7658 0.6628
clara 0.4661 0.4815 0.4818 0.4818 0.0164
Note: The Dunn Index has a value between Zero and∞, where the greater value of the Dunn Index represents
more accurate clustering results [14].
TABLE II
SILHOUETTE INDEX EVALUATION RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT CLUSTERING METHODS BASED ON THE SSDEEP FUZZY HASHING METHOD FOR
WANNACRY RANSOMWARE CORPUS
Clustering Method Cluster Size=2 Cluster Size=3 Cluster Size=4 Cluster Size=5 Cluster Size=6
kmeans 0.8584 0.8483 0.8451 0.8504 0.8618
pam 0.8271 0.2063 0.272 0.3261 0.3685
agnes 0.8584 0.8483 0.8447 0.8504 0.8618
diana 0.8584 0.8483 0.8447 0.8504 0.8618
clara 0.8271 0.8356 0.8431 0.8346 0.3388
Note: The Silhouette Index has a value in the interval [−1, 1] , where the greater value of the Silhouette
Index represents more accurate clustering results [15].
TABLE III
CONNECTIVITY INDEX EVALUATION RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT CLUSTERING METHODS BASED ON THE SSDEEP FUZZY HASHING METHOD FOR
WANNACRY RANSOMWARE CORPUS
Clustering Method Cluster Size=2 Cluster Size=3 Cluster Size=4 Cluster Size=5 Cluster Size=6
kmeans 2.929 5.8579 11.7159 11.7159 15.5738
pam 3.8579 4.9052 7.8341 10.7631 13.6921
agnes 2.929 5.8579 8.7869 11.7159 15.5738
diana 2.929 5.8579 8.7869 11.7159 15.5738
clara 3.8579 6.7869 9.7159 12.6448 16.5956
Note: The Connectivity Index has a value between Zero and∞, where the smaller value of the Connectivity
Index represents more accurate clustering results [16].
TABLE IV
COLLECTIVE EVALUATION RESULTS FOR ALL THE INDEXES FOR DIFFERENT CLUSTERING METHODS BASED ON THE SSDEEP FUZZY HASHING
METHOD FOR CLUSTER SIZE 2 (WHICH IS THE OPTIMAL CLUSTER SIZE BASED ON THE GROUND TRUTH)
Clustering Index kmeans pam agnes diana clara
Dunn Index 0.8348 0.4661 0.8348 0.8348 0.4661
Silhouette Index 0.8584 0.8271 0.8584 0.8584 0.8271
Connectivity Index 2.929 3.8579 2.929 2.929 3.8579
Note: Here kmeans, agnes and diana have produced the most accurate results for this particular experiment
based on the ground truth.
TABLE V
DUNN INDEX EVALUATION RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT CLUSTERING METHODS BASED ON THE SDHASH FUZZY HASHING METHOD FOR WANNACRY
RANSOMWARE CORPUS
Clustering Method Cluster Size=2 Cluster Size=3 Cluster Size=4 Cluster Size=5 Cluster Size=6
kmeans 0.7073 5.8244 0.3756 0.2502 0.0959
pam 0.0284 0.0397 0.3756 0.0729 0.1427
agnes 0.9756 5.8244 0.3756 0.3756 0.3085
diana 0.9756 5.8244 0.3756 0.2429 0.3163
clara 0.0284 0.0397 0.3756 0.1445 0.1479
Note: The Dunn Index has a value between Zero and∞, where the greater value of the Dunn Index represents
more accurate clustering results [14].
detected similarity for most of the WannaCry/WannaCryptor
ransomware samples. However, SDHASH detected similarity
in more samples including several insignificant similarity
scores, whereas SSDEEP could not detect as many similar
samples as SDHASH with only considered strong similarity
scores. This requires further investigation to determine their
effects on the accuracy of clustering results. Moreover, in the
future, it is essential to evaluate the proposed detection method
on a larger sample of WannaCry/WannaCryptor ransomware
and on other types of ransomware.
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